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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
[W]hen liberty hangs in the balance-and, in the case of the defendants facing
the death penalty, life itself-the standards should be higher than were met
in this case, and than have been imposed across the country. The more courts
admit this type of [expert] evidence without requiring documentation, profi-
ciency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure;
we should require more.1
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
DNA evidence has exonerated over two hundred wrongfully con-
victed defendants in the last several years, providing insights into the
causes of such convictions. One such cause, faulty scientific evidence,
is a focus of this article. For decades, many have written about the
prevalence of and reasons for wrongful convictions2-what I have
termed "misconvictions." A few reasons support the coinage "miscon-
victions": the miscarriage of justice when an innocent person is con-
victed; the mistakes involved in the prosecution and trial of the case;
the mistaken identification that may have occurred; and finally, the
recognition that all wrongful convictions are a missed opportunity to
convict the person who actually committed the crime. In light of these
concerns, misconvictions is an apt term.
This Article provides a new perspective on misconvictions by focus-
ing on the intersection of ethics and expert evidence in criminal cases,
specifically considering the actions of judges and prosecutors. The Ar-
ticle has a dual focus: first, to explain the forensic science concerns
that contribute to misconvictions; and second, to contemplate the role
that the "ministers of justice"-the executive and judicial branches-
play in creating misconvictions by their management of expert evi-
dence.3 The Article then provides suggestions for improving the qual-
ity of justice to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions.
1. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005) (Gertner, J.)
(permitting a witness to testify about the similarity of marks between shell cas-
ings at the scene and those from the defendant's weapon but forbidding the wit-
ness from testifying that it was a match "to the exclusion of every other firearm
in the world").
2. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING
THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds.,
2006) [hereinafter ACHIEVING JUSTICE]; EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE IN-
NOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Yale Univ. Press 1932); Sco'r CHRISTIAN-
SON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASES (N.Y. Univ. Press 2004); C.
RONALD HUFF, AYRE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT:
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (Sage Publ'ns. 1996); Samuel R.
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542-46 (2005).
3. A few authors have considered the intersection of ethics and scientific evidence in
criminal cases. See Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence By Prose-
cutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17 (2003) (discussing how prosecutors misuse
scientific evidence); Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obliga-
tion of Attorneys, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 425-31 (2001) (discussing some ethi-
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While trial judges decide whether evidence is admissible in crimi-
nal trials, prosecutors wield exceptional power in decisions about
whom to prosecute and what evidence to introduce while trying a case.
These two ministers of justice-possessing virtually all the power to
regulate a criminal case-must be held to a high standard, not only to
ensure convictions of those who have committed crimes, but also to
ensure that to the degree possible, the innocent are not convicted. Yet
prosecutors, by using unreliable forensic evidence and questionable
expert witnesses, and judges, by failing to exercise their gatekeeping
role in a sufficiently diligent manner, have become part of the mecha-
nism by which misconvictions occur. This Article discusses ways for
prosecutors and judges to rise to the ethical demands of their
positions.
Part II of this Article details the laboratory failures, the proficiency
concerns, and the myriad of problems with the so-called "individuali-
zation" specialties that seek to match a person to a crime.
Part III explains how prosecutors, in their role as ministers of jus-
tice, have an affirmative duty to try to avoid the wrongful conviction of
innocent people by using unreliable expert evidence. The Article pro-
vides specific suggestions for achieving that goal. Part IV explains the
ethics issues implicated when judges exercise their gatekeeping and
trial management roles and also discusses options to help trial courts
comply with such ethical obligations.
II. THE SCIENCE OF MISCONVICTIONS
In March of 2003, Josiah Sutton was released from prison after
being convicted at the age of 16 and serving nearly four years for a
rape he did not commit.4 The damning evidence against Sutton?
DNA, the so-called infallible genetic fingerprint. The exculpatory evi-
dence? Also DNA.5 This case is one of three in which a faulty DNA
comparison was implicated in a misconviction. 6 Clearly, even the best
scientific evidence is far from infallible.
cal concerns related to the use of substandard forensic evidence at trial). Other
authors have discussed ethical concerns relating to expert evidence in a primarily
civil context. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of
Scientific Knowledge: Is There an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert's Testi-
mony?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 341 (2003); Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and
Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465 (1999); Dick Thornburgh, Junk
Science-The Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 449
(1998).
4. Roma Khanna & Alan Berstein, Joyous Sutton Tastes Freedom, HOUSTON CHRON-
ICLE, Mar. 13, 2003, at Al.
5. Id.
6. See data collected by The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org
(last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
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Courts and commentators increasingly recognize that juries have
convicted many innocent people. 7 As is well-accepted, the causes of
and blame for misconvictions are legions and include mistaken eyewit-
ness identification, 9 false confessions,1o sleeping and incompetent de-
fense lawyers,1 1 lying witnesses, 12 and overzealous and misguided
prosecutors. 13 What many do not realize, however, is that faulty sci-
ence contributes to these misconvictions.
7. See, e.g., CHRISTIANSON, supra note 2, at 5 (referring to one study which claims
that between 3 and 10 percent of all felony convictions are erroneous and another
study which indicates that ten thousand innocent people are wrongly convicted
every year).
8. Id. at 8 ("In most cases, it wouldn't be fair to point the finger solely at a single
culprit-that is, police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial judges, juries, appel-
late courts, or legislators. Wrongful conviction is a team sport.")
9. See The Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocence
project.org/understand/eyewitness-misidentification.php (last visited May 27,
2007) (noting 75 percent of wrongful convictions include eyewitness misidentifi-
cation); See also Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Inno-
cence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 215 (Apr. 2005) ("[Ilt is
clear that eyewitness misidentification, found in nearly three quarters of [mis-
convictions], are the most common source of error. .. ").
The problem of erroneous eyewitness identification is well studied and amply
documented. For a compelling discussion about the errors of eyewitness identifi-
cation and the need for expert testimony to inform the jury about such problems,
see Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 909 (1995).
10. Surprisingly, data collected from The Innocence Project indicate that over 25 per-
cent of misconvictions involved some form of false confession. See The Innocence
Project, False Confessions, http://www.innocenceproject.orglunderstand/False-
Confessions.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2007); See also Gross et al., supra note 2, at
544 (stating that 15 percent of those wrongly convicted included a false confes-
sion). For a comprehensive discussion about and analysis of false confessions, see
Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (analyzing 125 cases of exonerated de-
fendants who confessed falsely), and Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 105, 110 (1997) (discussing the empirical evidence showing the preva-
lence of false confessions caused by standard interrogation techniques and sug-
gesting "constitutional safeguards designed to reduce the government's creation
and use of such confessions").
11. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 79-91 (discussing the failures of defense
counsel that contribute to misconvictions and providing suggestions to address
those concerns); HUFF ET AL., supra note 2, at 76-77 (discussing defense counsel's
role in creating misconvictions). Although defense lawyer negligence is clearly a
factor in many misconvictions, it is beyond the scope of the Article. This factor is
considered in depth, however, in a book the author is writing, JANE CAMPBELL
MORIARTY, MISCONVICTIONS: WHEN LAW AND SCIENCE COLLIDE (forthcoming N.Y.
Univ. Press 2008) (manuscript on file with author).
12. See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 2, at 542-44, (discussing the role that false accu-
sation and perjury play in convicting innocent people).
13. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Dis-
cipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275 (2004) (discussing the frequency of
prosecutorial misconduct in wrongful convictions); See also The Innocence Pro-
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Frequently and surprisingly, misconvictions occur because of bad
science, poor laboratory work, and outright fraud on the part of the
experts. Professor Michael J. Saks remarked:
If the criminal justice community and the public were startled to learn that
numerous innocent people were convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to
long terms of imprisonment and sometimes even to execution, they will be
even more surprised to learn that forensic science has played a large part in
those erroneous convictions.
1 4
A recent article confirms this opinion, stating that "[iun twenty-one of
the more recent exonerations ... the exonerated's initial trial included
testimony from a forensic examiner that was later established to be
imprecise or clearly mistaken."15 Four of those twenty-one had been
sentenced to death.16
Due in large part to the work of The Innocence Project at Cardozo
Law School and other law and journalism schools around the country,
numerous misconvicted defendants have been exonerated by DNA
testing. As of May, 2007, 203 people have been exonerated by DNA
testing.17 Of the first 130 exonerations, three involved faulty DNA
inclusions, and twenty-one involved microscopic hair comparisons.' 8
A study of the original Innocence Project data published in Science
reported that "erroneous forensic science expert testimony [was] the
second most common contributing factor to wrongful convictions." 19
Despite the Supreme Court's requirement that only reliable expert
testimony be admitted, 20 unreliable expert forensic science testimony
ject, Government Misconduct, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Government-Misconduct.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) (noting the prevalence
of prosecutorial misconduct in wrongful convictions).
14. Saks, supra note 3, at 423 (discussing the Innocence Project exonerations). Pro-
fessor Bennett L. Gershman agrees. Gershman, supra note 3, at 18-19 ("Many, if
not most, . . . wrongful convictions are attributable to scientific evidence
presented by prosecutors as trustworthy, and relied on as such by juries, when in
fact the evidence was erroneous or fraudulent.").
15. Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ulti-
mate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 395-96 (2004) [hereinafter Cooley,
Reforming the Forensic Science Community].
16. Id. at 396.
17. See Innocence Project, Preserving Justice, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last
visited May 3, 2007).
18. See Innocence Project, Causes of Wrongful Conviction, http://www.innocence
project.orglunderstand (last visited May 18, 2007).
19. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 893 (2005). For a critique of that article
and Saks and Koehler's response to that critique, see Rockne Harmon et al.,
Questions About Forensic Science, 311 SCIENCE 607-10 (2006).
20. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (providing that all expert testimony
must "rest[ I on a reliable foundation"). While Daubert applies only to federal
courts, a majority of state courts have adopted a reliability standard to govern
the admission of expert testimony. Moreover, many states that continue to use
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has been introduced into evidence and innocent people have been
wrongly convicted due, at least in part, to its admission. Testimony
may be unreliable for several reasons, including: fraud and negligence
in the laboratory; the failure to use blind testing procedures; the lack
of meaningful standards to judge the validity of a given theory; inade-
quate or nonexistent proficiency testing; and inadequate or nonexis-
tent databases from which to generate comparisons.
A. Scientists and Their Laboratories: A Multitude of
Concerns
Several crime lab expert witnesses throughout the country have
testified falsely in criminal cases in order to assist the prosecution in
convicting a defendant. 2 1 After Professors Saks and Koehler ex-
amined The Innocence Project data, they concluded that "forensic
scientists are the witnesses most likely to present misleading or fraud-
ulent testimony."22
Fred Zain was a police chemist who testified fraudulently in both
West Virginia and Texas.2 3 As one commentator noted, "He had a for-
midable reputation as the serologist who could find (incriminating) re-
sults when no one else could."2 4 The reason for this reputation, as it
turned out, was Zain's willingness to lie, omit, and otherwise deceive
factfinders about results in at least 130 cases.2 5 A special investiga-
tion report stated:
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the
strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on indi-
vidual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on
multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items had been tested,
when only a single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as
conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to
create the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained from
the so-called "general acceptance" standard have been influenced by Daubert's
reliability requirement and require greater proof of the trustworthiness of such
evidence. Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand
Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 A.B.A. JUDGES' J., Fall 2005,
at 24.
21. See Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 15, at
399-408 (discussing the various experts who have testified falsely for the prose-
cution); Paul C. Gianelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1318-20 (2004) (dis-
cussing widespread fraud that has occurred in criminal trials). See generally
JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL TRIALS § 12:4 (West Supp. 2006) [hereinafter MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE] (discussing fraud by forensic scientists).
22. Saks & Koehler, supra note 19, at 893.
23. MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 21, § 12:4, at 12-6.
24. William C. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science of Forensic DNA
Testing, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1997).
25. See id. at 1115-16.
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all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct
or to report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results;
(10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a match
with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable
results. 2 6
These results were part of a "systematic practice" in which his superi-
ors may have ignored or concealed complaints about his work.27 The
report further noted that the procedural deficiencies of the lab contrib-
uted to the problems.28
Zain, unfortunately, is not unique. Other investigations have dis-
covered large-scale fraud by other forensic experts in New York,
Texas, and Oklahoma, among other places. 29 FBI experts have pro-
vided testimony that is both dishonest30 and erroneous. 3 1 According
to a Justice Department report written about an FBI investigation,
the FBI laboratory had a number of problems that "raised . . .ques-
tions about the competency, integrity and bias of the FBI laboratory"
and its examiners. 32
Recently, the FBI agreed to stop using bullet lead comparison, af-
ter a report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded the
technique was "seriously misleading."33 The examiners who testified
about that specialty claimed they were able to link boxes of bullets
owned by the defendant with bullets found at the scene by comparing
the trace elements in both.34 Despite admitting that the manufactur-
ing and distribution of bullets was too varied to testify about matches,
26. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 516 (W. Va. 1993).
27. See id. at 511-16.
28. Id. at 517. The report describes the following lab shortcomings:
(1) no written documentation of testing methodology; (2) no written qual-
ity assurance program; (3) no written internal or external auditing pro-
cedures; (4) no routine proficiency testing of laboratory technicians;
(5) no technical review of work product; (6) no written documentation of
instrument maintenance and calibration; (7) no written testing proce-
dures manual; (8) failure to follow generally-accepted scientific testing
standards with respect to certain tests; (9) inadequate record-keeping;
and (10) failure to conduct collateral testing.
Id.
29. See Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 15, at
399-408. See also Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs, CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2004, at 1 (noting that problems ranging from negligence
to deception have been discovered in at lease seventeen states).
30. Id. at 403.
31. See MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 21, § 12:4 at 12-4 to 5 (discussing
the FBI laboratory errors set forth in the 1997 Justice Department's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) report).
32. Id. at 12-7.
33. Charles Piller, FBI Abandons Controversial Bullet-Matching Technique, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 2, 2005, at A38. For a fuller discussion of the NAS panel report, see
Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 22-23.
34. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 22; Piller, supra note 33.
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the FBI Laboratory director inexplicably stated, "We stand by the re-
sults of the reports we have already issued."3 5
An additional concern is that many crime labs lack standards, are
not certified, and often operate in an entirely unregulated manner.
3 6
Where labs are certified, there are still concerns about how meaning-
ful that process may be.37 Many laboratories-including the FBI lab-
oratory-fail or have failed to employ proper procedures, such as blind
testing, that could reduce the potential for error.38 In The Daubert/
Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion,39 the authors describe many
observer effects that plague forensic science labs in general, including
expectation bias, which illustrates that information provided before
an observation can color the observation itself.4o According to well-
established psychological principles, if a forensic examiner is told that
the questioned sample will likely match the exemplar, the examiner is
more likely to find a match than an examiner who is not given such
information. 4 1 Nonetheless, blind testing is not a mandatory require-
ment in many forensic laboratories, even though "[tihe simplest, most
powerful, and most useful procedure to protect against the distorting
effects of unstated assumptions, collateral information, and improper
expectations and motivations is blind testing."42
A related laboratory problem is the lack of scientific culture in
many forensic labs in America. In traditional scientific disciplines (as
opposed to forensic science), where scientists are primarily Ph.D.s and
graduate students, the culture emphasizes "methodological rigor,
35. Id. at 23 (citing Piller, supra note 33).
36. See Paul C. Giannelli, The "Science" of Wrongful Convictions, CRIM. JUST., Spring
2003, at 55 (noting that, except for the State of New York, there is no mandatory
accreditation).
37. Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EuR. J.L. & ECON. 255, 261
(2005) (questioning accreditation standards).
38. See Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 15, at 406-07.
39. D. Michael Risinger et. al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (2002).
40. Id. at 13-15. This article describes a number of other problems, including confir-
mation bias, anchoring effects, role effects, conformity effects, and experimenter
effects, all of which may be implicated in forensic testing. Id. at 12-21; accord
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 293 (describing how forensic scientists
can be unwittingly influenced).
41. See Risinger et al., supra note 39, at 13. The authors describe how a pathologist,
after being told she is looking at abnormal cells, might be more likely to perceive
abnormal cells. Id.
42. Id. at 45. In a study of fingerprint examiners designed to test the effects of extra-
neous contextual information, researchers concluded that the examiners were
vulnerable to the information. Indeed, two-thirds of the experts made inconsis-
tent decisions. Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600, 610 (2006).
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openness, and cautious interpretation of data."4 3 However, "[iun fo-
rensic science, 96% of positions are held by persons with bachelor's
degrees (or less), 3% [hold] master's degrees, and 1% Ph.D.s." 44 Thus,
forensic labs often lack this scientific culture, seeming to value the
ends of the process far more than the means-a position at odds with
science. 45
A final concern about laboratories centers around those examiners
who testify that their unique methods allow them to see what others
cannot. Dr. Michael West, a dentist, testified that his special blue
light was able to illuminate and compare marks that other examiners
missed-not only bite-marks, but such things as tool-marks and
shoeprints.46 Physical anthropologist, Louise Robbins, Ph.D., said she
was able to identify shoe and footprints using a grid format to identify
multiple points of shape of the shoeprint within various categories to
match it, Cinderella-like to the foot.4 7
While many of these laboratory problems are being addressed,48
the problems are far from resolved.
B. Forensic Individualization
"Forensic individualization" claims to be able "to associate an item
of evidence found at a crime scene with its unique source, to the exclu-
sion of all others" in the world. 49 Courts routinely admit this type of
43. Saks & Koehler, supra note 19, at 893; See "also Koppl, supra note 37, at 256
(discussing the potential unreliability of forensic science due to its failure to fol-
low the scientific model of criticism, review, and reproduction).
44. Saks & Koehler, supra note 19, at 893.
45. See DAVID GOODSTEIN, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 67, 74 (West Group 2d ed., 2000) ("[S]cience ... is an arena in which
ideas do battle, with observations and data the tools of combat."); Koppl, supra
note 37, at 256.
46. As Professor Paul C. Giannelli discusses in his article, The Abuse of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439, 453-57 (1997), forensic odontologist, Michael West, testi-
fied in numerous cases about his ability to compare not only bite-marks, but vari-
ous other forms of visual forensic comparison evidence. Although unable to
provide photographic evidence, West claimed that the use of his "blue light"-the
so called "West Phenomenon"-allowed him to make such comparisons. See id. at
454 & n.88.
47. See ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES § 17.11 at 1049-52 (4th ed. 1995); accord Giannelli, supra note 46, at
457-62.
48. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 47-58 (discussing proposed changes to
crime laboratories that would assist in reducing the likelihood of wrongful convic-
tions); Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal
Justice System, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 321-22 (2006) (discussing various
groups that are attempting to improve the quality of crime laboratories).
49. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 17. In a recent federal case involving a com-
parison of cartridge cases, the expert claimed to be able to make the match to the
firearm in question "to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world." United
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evidence, which includes the comparison and "matching" of DNA, hair,
handwriting, photographs of items with items, fingerprints, tool-
marks, teeth-marks and shoeprints-generally without proof that its
methodology meets the contemporary standard of scientific reliabil-
ity.5 0 With the exception of nuclear DNA testing, which rests on solid
scientific and statistical ground, the individualization specialties have
numerous foundational shortcomings. Indeed, "the data supporting
the validity of these techniques, the safeguards against fraud or mis-
take, the training and supervision of the relevant personnel, and the
existence and enforcement of sound, standardized procedures are
shockingly deficient."51
Individualization rests on two principles: (1) that each fingerprint,
footprint or handwriting is unique; and (2) that examiners can accu-
rately make a conclusive match between known and unknown sam-
ples.52 Little data supports either of these claims, 53 especially with
respect to handwriting,54 tool-marks, 55 bite-marks (forensic odontol-
ogy),5 6 shoeprint marks (forensic podiatry),5 7 and hair comparison.58
States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-09 (D. Mass. 2005). Such a conclusion
was disallowed by the trial judge, who found such a conclusion to "stretch[ ] well
beyond [the expert's] data and methodology." Id. at 109.
50. See Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 24-26.
51. Andrew E. Taslitz, Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent: The ABA Takes
a Stand, CraM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 27 (citing various critiques).
52. See Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 18 (explaining individualization). In a
recent case, a forensic document examiner testified he had a "90% confidence
level" in the accuracy of his claimed match of handwriting. United States v.
Smart, 135 Fed. App'x. 337, 339 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing the appellee's brief).
However, such a number has no statistical basis in fact.
53. See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliabil-
ity: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
15, 57 (2003) (discussing the lack of objective testing methodology with handwrit-
ing analysis, among other forensic comparison methodologies); Saks & Koehler,
supra note 19, at 892.
54. John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale
of Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 31:42 at 58-61
(David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2006) (explaining why handwriting comparison
does not meet the definition of a science and discussing some of its shortcomings
as a technical skill). For further discussion of the shortcomings on handwriting
comparison, see D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience
in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IowA L.
REV. 21 (1996).
55. See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of
Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. Sc. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(explaining the various failures and shortcomings of firearm and tool-mark
identification).
56. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 54, § 31:45 at 64 (claiming that bite-mark
comparison has low reliability and that "forensic odontologists have been more
successful in convincing courts of the legitimacy of their opinions than they have
been in convincing other forensic scientists"); cf. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note
47, § 16.05, 974-75 (claiming there is now agreement among forensic odontolo-
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Stretching the concept of individualization even further, some federal
courts have allowed testimony by alleged experts in photographic com-
parisons, who testify that they can meaningfully compare photo-
graphs of items or persons with the actual item or person.5 9
Despite the claims of forensic examiners, there are numerous foun-
dational weaknesses inherent in the individualization specialties-
not the least of which is that there are "few scientists . .. [and] little
science" involved. 60 Professor Saks has gone so far as to call these
species of evidence "contenders for being the shoddiest science offered
to the courts."61 All individualization matches turn on purely subjec-
tive decision-making founded on experience-based knowledge, with no
objective standards by which to determine either accuracy or error
gists that bite-marks can be "vital evidence," but discussing the extensive factors
that limit its utility, including the implications of biting into living tissue that
changes, or the problems that changes in the victim's posture may cause).
57. See, e.g., MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 47, at 1049-52 (recognizing that courts
have not scrutinized this type of testimony as carefully as they should have and
discussing some of the more scandalous examiners in the field).
58. See, e.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 54, § 31:37, at 48-49 (claiming that
hair comparison which is used to exclude a suspect is "a rather good form of evi-
dence," but that as inclusive evidence, it "is a miserable form of evidence"). In
some places, crime laboratories are beginning to rely on mitochondrial DNA test-
ing to replace visual hair comparison, which appears to be a step in the right
direction, although some note that this type of DNA testing is still not fully le-
gally accepted. See, e.g., Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and
Post-conviction Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 589 n.5 (2004).
59. See, e.g., United States v. McKreith, 140 F. App'x. 112, 114 (11th Cir. 2005). In
McKreith, forensic analyst Richard Vorder Bruegge viewed surveillance photos of
the crime and compared them with items of the defendant. He testified that the
shirt worn by defendant "matched the class characteristics of the shirt worn by
the bank robber" and that the defendant's black bag was "indistinguishable" from
the one in the photos. Id. The analyst also opined that there were similarities in
"the shape of the nose, mouth and chin" of the defendant and of the bank robber.
The court upheld the district court's admission of the testimony, stating that
"Itihe jury was free to accept or reject Vorder Bruegge's testimony" and that, in
any event, any possible error was harmless. Id. at 116. Other courts have admit-
ted such testimony as well. See also United States v. Martin, 46 F. App'x. 119,
122-23 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the defendant called Vorder Bruegge as a
witness).
60. See, e.g., Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science or Forgettable Science?, 80 IND. L. J.
80, 81-82 (2005) (describing the myriad of shortcomings and noting the lack of
science and scientists in forensic science).
61. Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic
Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 879 (2000).
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rates.6 2 Moreover, unlike DNA testing, no databases are used to ex-
trapolate a meaningful interpretation of a match.6 3
The problems inherent with visual individualization go beyond the
two principal problems and encompass a wealth of other concerns that
are directly related to the accuracy of the process.
1. Questioning Uniqueness
Few dispute that fingerprints are unique (although such a claim
cannot be proven)64 but many dispute the uniqueness of hair, teeth
marks, shoeprints, or weapon markings. 65 Despite lacking data to es-
tablish how rare (or common) hair, handwriting, and shoeprints are,
examiners testify under oath that such prints, writings or markings
are unique. The unanswered (and unanswerable) question in bite-
mark cases is how possible is it that another set of teeth left the bite-
mark in question? Forensic examiners do not have an answer to that
question. Nonetheless, the jury is left with the impression that if the
examiner declares a match, he has accurately identified the print,
writing, or marking as unique to the perpetrator-a far more proba-
tive assertion than examiners can legitimately make. 66
62. Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 53, at 57; See also Simon A. Cole, More than
Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 985, 993-94 (2005) [hereinafter Cole, More Than Zero] (noting that
fingerprint examiners testify a finding of individualization is a matter of suffi-
ciency, which is simply 'the examiner's determination that adequate unique de-
tails of the friction skin source area are revealed in the impression").
For arguments about the theoretical problem of experience-based knowledge
not subject to objective standards, see Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the
Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the Salem
Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43, 84 (2001) [hereinafter Moriarty, Wonders of
the Invisible World] (arguing in favor of an objective standard to judge experien-
tial-based knowledge), and Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, 64 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 373, 404-09 (2001) (creating a compelling argument that an
expert must be able to describe "objectively the way in which the hypothesis at
issue can be tested and how the expert put the hypothesis to the test").
63. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 55, at 8 (explaining that the database for firearms
is "radically incomplete" and that no databases exist for any other types of tool-
marks).
64. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 54, § 31:40 at 54-58 (claiming that, to date,
there has been no duplication of exact ridge matches).
65. See, e.g., id. § 31:37 at 48 ("The most that can be said about a hair is that it is
consistent with having originated from a particular person, but that it would also
be consistent with the hair of numerous other people."); William A. Tobin & Wil-
liam C. Thompson, Evaluating and Challenging Forensic Identification Evidence,
THE CHAMPION, July 2006, at 12, 17 (noting the lack of a scientific basis for the
uniqueness of bite-marks and tool-marks, among other forensic science evidence).
66. Since there is no database for various individualization specialties, no statistics
can be generated to create probabilities-a process employed with DNA evidence.
For an explanation of DNA comparison and probability issues, see David H. Kaye
& George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 485, 524-48 (West Group 2d ed., 2000).
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2. Questioning the Meaning of a Match
Although examiners in many European nations require a range be-
tween eight and sixteen points to declare a fingerprint match, 67 there
is no scientifically premised source to support that choice of numbers.
Forensic examiners in the United States, however, use neither a mini-
mum nor a standard number of points of comparison by which to de-
clare a match of any type of forensic individualization. Rather, the
examiner declares a match when she is satisfied, using the so-called
ACE-V method: an acronym for analyze, compare, evaluate, and ver-
ify.68 What this method means, however, is that the examiner looks
at a sample, compares it to a known sample, and then determines
whether they appear to match. The examiner then has another exam-
iner or a supervisor review the conclusions-the verification. The ver-
ification is not generally an independent test where the second
examiner does not know what the first examiner's result was.6 9
According to the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Anal-
ysis, Study and Technology (a group established in 1997 and spon-
sored by the F.B.I.), a conclusion is justified when the examiner makes
a "determination that adequate unique details of the friction skin
source area are revealed in the impression"-an obviously unreview-
able subjective standard. 70 In fact, one of the government's leading
fingerprint examiners has acknowledged that the examiners' opinions
are "very subjective."71 Equally troubling is the significant amount of
67. Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings
From Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1260
n.315 (2004), (citing 28 FINGERPRINT WHORLD 19 (2002)). Great Britain no longer
requires a minimum number of points and has adopted the U.S. standard. Id. at
1260; see also Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 17 n.5 (Mass. 2005)
(noting the change by Great Britain).
68. See United States v. Mahone, 328 F. Supp. 2d 77, 90 (D. Me. 2004) (noting the
footprint examiner claimed to be unsure whether the ACE-V verification was
"blind"); Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 62, at 994 (noting use of the ACE-V
method by latent fingerprint examiners).
69. Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 62, at 994. However, after Brandon Mayfield
was wrongfully accused of being involved with the Madrid bombing, the FBI has
claimed it would use blind verification for select cases. Id. at 985-87, (citing Rob-
ert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Ma-
drid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION, 706, 715 (2004)).
70. Cole, More than Zero, supra note 62, at 994, (citing Scientific Working Group for
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology [hereinafter SWGFAST], Friction
Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners § 1.5 (SWGFAST,
version 1.01, 2002), available at http://www.swgfast.org/ [hereinafter SWGFAST,
Methodology].
71. Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is
Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 636 (2002), (quoting David R. Ashbaugh, Guest
Editorial, The Premises of Friction Ridge Identification, Clarity, and the Identifi-
cation Process, 44 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 499, 511 (1994)).
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disagreement among examiners about how many common ridge char-
acteristics must be present to declare a match. 72
Another concern with fingerprint comparison is that it is not a
comparison of two rolled prints from a carefully prepared sample, but
a comparison of a rolled print to a so-called latent print-whatever is
found in the field. These latent prints are often smudged, partial
prints that have far less clear detail than a rolled print. Thus, false
claims of a match in the actual day-to-day work of fingerprint compar-
ison are always a possibility; the concerns are not simply theoretical
or academic. For example, a small, smudged partial latent fingerprint
might be positively matched to a rolled print despite a lack of stan-
dards by which to judge that conclusion and no minimum number of
points of comparison to declare a match. Even if several points match,
would the rest of the fingerprint (not present on the latent print) prove
exculpatory?
Other forms of individualization testimony are supported by an
even thinner reed, since handwriting, hair comparison, bite-mark,
tool-mark, and shoeprint examiners have never had a standard by
which to declare a match-again, the examiner simply gives his im-
pressionistic estimate that the samples in question match, generally
using the ACE-V method. 73
3. Proficiency Testing and Error Rates
Although visual individualization examiners often claim a zero er-
ror rate,74 there is neither theoretical nor scientific support for such a
proposition. 7 5 In fact, in the area of fingerprinting-considered by
law enforcement and the public to be the gold standard for visual indi-
vidualization-the recent high-profile error wrongfully inculpating
American Brandon Mayfield as one of the Madrid train bombers cer-
tainly deflates the long-maintained boast that fingerprint comparison
is infallible. Similar errors have occurred throughout the past dec-
ade.76 Indeed, how could such an assertion of infallibility be main-
72. Id. at 610.
73. For a contemporary analysis claiming the ACE-V procedure meets reliability
standards, see, for example, Mahone, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 87-91 (reviewing the
ACE-V methodology).
74. Cole, More than Zero, supra note 62, at 987, 1034 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS, at iv
(1985) ("Of all the methods of identification, fingerprinting alone has proved to be
both infallible and feasible.").
75. Id. passim (discussing the issue of error and error rates throughout the article);
See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forward, International Perspective on Scien-
tific Evidence, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 944 (1997), (remarking that there are
"a stack of studies documenting the margin of error in scientific analysis").
76. See Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 62, at 97-1016 (discussing various cases of
misattributed fingerprints).
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tained? While any comparison process might be competent, the
individuals performing the comparison are still human and still falli-
ble. They are, like the rest of us, "clay up to their eyebrows."7 7 Some
of the individualization areas, such as fingerprinting, claim that the
so-called "methodological" error rate is zero, but concede the possibil-
ity of human error-a distinction critics argue is both irrelevant and
misleading to the question of accuracy. 78
Another shortcoming the forensic individualization specialties
share, however, is that few of them have calculated a meaningful error
rate. Thus, the very real danger they pose is that no one is really
certain about the ability of the examiners to do what they say they can
do as accurately as they claim they can do it.
The minimal amount of proficiency testing which is completed in
forensic individualization specialties is not encouraging. As Judge
Pollak admitted in the contentious and oft-discussed case of United
States v. Llera Plaza, the defense raised "real questions about the ade-
quacy of the proficiency tests taken annually by certified FBI examin-
ers."79 Moreover, the court concluded, "the tests can be of little
assistance in providing the test makers with a discriminating mea-
sure of the relative competence of the test takers."8 0 Nonetheless, the
court determined the examiners could testify and provide conclusions
about fingerprint comparison.8 1
The small body of evidence concerning proficiency in other forms of
forensic individualization is also discouraging. In their 2005 Science
article, Saks and Koehler collected proficiency test error rates and
noted error rates as high as 64% for bite-mark comparison, a 40% er-
ror rate for handwriting comparison, and a 12% error rate for micro-
scopic hair comparison.82
4. The Circular Reasoning Problem
As mainstream science demands and the Supreme Court recog-
nizes, one of the hallmarks of science is that it generates results that
77. Imwinkelried, supra note 75, at 942-43. Craig M. Cooley, a lawyer with a
master's degree in forensic science, notes that despite repeated claims of infalli-
bility, "numerous studies indicat[e] that the error rate in the forensic sciences is
far from zero." Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note
15, at 381, 393 (citing various studies on proficiency testing error rates).
78. Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 62, at 1034-42.
79. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
80. Id. at 565.
81. Id. at 571.
82. Saks & Koehler, supra note 19, at 895; see also Cooley, Reforming the Forensic
Science Community, supra note 15, at 393-94 (discussing error rate studies).
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can be tested by others.83 Thus, the preference for controlled, double-
blind studies, the demanding system of blind peer-review, and the re-
quirement that data be reproducible, collectively point to the impor-
tance of independent reviewers testing the quality of the scientific
endeavor.8 4 By comparison, forensic science operates in a self-con-
tained chamber, where its own examiners are the ones to vouch for the
correctness of the underlying theory, as well as the accuracy, quality,
and the general acceptance of their professions.8 5
One possible reason the circular reasoning problem has infected
forensic individualization specialties can be traced to the Frye general
acceptance standard, which governed the admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence in many states before Daubert.8 6 Frye required that "the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."8 7 Thus, "the thing"-for example, the belief that
handwriting samples can be meaningfully and conclusively compared
and identified-must be generally accepted by the "particular field to
which it belongs." The field, of course, is handwriting comparison. So,
to meet this standard, those practicing in the field can simply testify
that handwriting comparison is generally accepted.8 8 As one court
noted, the relevant community "is devoid of financially disinterested
parties, such as academics."8 9 The relevant community generally con-
sists of those very individuals whose livelihood depends on the contin-
ued general acceptance of such a forensic specialty. Nonetheless,
courts do not appear to be troubled by this circularity. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently noted in a fingerprint exami-
nation case that the judge "properly ensured" that the relevant com-
munity of those judging latent fingerprint methodology was broad
enough to include "some practitioners who acknowledge flaws in the
methodology" and to tolerate "some, albeit, limited room for dis-
83. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (noting the impor-
tance in scientific method of generating hypotheses and testing them); GOOD-
STEIN, supra note 45, at 73-75.
84. GOODSTEIN, supra note 45, at 74-75.
85. See Koppl, supra note 37, at 257-59, for a discussion of this problem.
86. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Professor Schwartz, how-
ever, provides a compelling critique of Daubert and an argument in favor of a
modified Frye standard in Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect The
Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HIARv. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
87. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
88. With the exception of polygraph and voice spectrometry, few thought to challenge
the general acceptance of most expert testimony pre-Daubert, except for DNA
evidence, which was subject to numerous challenges. See, e.g., United States v.
Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 1994); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989)
(determining that DNA profiling met general acceptance standards).
89. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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sent."90 However, the community consisted primarily of those who
compare fingerprints for a living. Moreover, the court did not under-
stand the implications of noting that the community allowed only
"limited room for dissent." Surely the mark of a well-grounded science
is its willingness to accept and respond to robust critique and dis-
sent.9 1 Although Daubert has replaced the Frye standard in many
state jurisdictions, Daubert's inquiry also often includes an analysis of
the general acceptance of the proposed evidence. 92
In the 1830s and 1840s, phrenology-or the study of brain func-
tions as manifested by cranial features-was in full swing as a scien-
tific endeavor, with conferences devoted to its study and its own
scholarly publication-the American Phrenological Journal.93 One of
the inventors of the system of phrenology was Dr. Franz Joseph Gall,
who attempted to identify twenty-seven human faculties that could be
identified by various cranial manifestations. 94 Gall's conclusions em-
anated from "scientific observation of countless samples"9 5 and among
the applications for phrenology was its believed utility in criminol-
ogy. 9 6 At the time, if one asked a phrenologist whether phrenology
was good science, the answer would be undoubtedly "yes." Today, few
people would equate phrenology with good science. 97 Yet, phrenology
shares an important trait with forensic individualization evidence:
conclusions are not based upon independent testing but upon "scien-
tific observations of countless samples." Both are experience-based
conclusions that rest on the foundation that: (1) the science is valid
because of extensive observations; (2) those skilled in the science can
do it properly; and (3) the underlying theory is valid because of the
care used by the practitioners. The circular reasoning problem, how-
ever, is far more easy to spot in the case of phrenology than it is with
other forms of forensic individualization, as evidenced by a 2005 Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision noting the ACE-V
90. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 25 (Mass. 2005). Although Massa-
chusetts uses a Daubert-style reliability test, they have noted that "'general ac-
ceptance in the relevant . . . community will continue to be the significant, and
often the only, issue.'" Id. at 23 (citations omitted).
91. See Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 15, at 392,
(stating that "science thrives by detecting errors and shortcomings of asserted
hypotheses").
92. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) ("'General accept-
ance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.... Widespread acceptance can be an
important factor.. ").
93. Pierre Schlag, Commentary Law and Phrenology, 110 HARv. L. REV. 877, 877
(1997).
94. Id. at 878, 880.
95. Id. at 880.
96. Id. at 878.
97. However, given the proliferation and popularity of such pseuodosciences as new-
age crystal healing and horoscopes, some might disagree with the stated
proposition.
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method for comparing fingerprints "defies easy testing because it does
not require a minimum number of similarities, but rather operates on
a subjective sliding scale."98 That is to say, "I know a match when I
see one."
It is not only the Frye jurisdictions that have an inherent circular
logic problem. In Kumho Tire, the majority decides that the Daubert
reliability standard and gatekeeping obligation apply to all forms of
expert testimony, not simply scientific expert evidence. The objective
of such gatekeeping, the court reasons, is to ensure the reliability and
relevancy of such evidence. Thus, the expert, "whether basing testi-
mony upon professional studies or personal experience, [must] em-
ploy[] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."99 Inter-
preting this phrase literally would permit virtually any substandard
expert evidence to be admissible so long as the courtroom testimony is
of equal "intellectual rigor" to the practice in the field. Indeed, the
language would seem to give the particularly shoddy expert testimony
easy entry into the courts-as has proven prophetic in the case of
prosecutorial forensic science.
In civil cases, many federal courts are loath to admit what they
consider insufficiently well-grounded expert testimony. 10 0 For exam-
ple, courts have declined to admit expert medical testimony that a de-
fendant's product caused plaintiffs' alleged multiple chemical
sensitivity. 10 1 What these courts claim to require is some indepen-
dent proof that such a theory has a solid basis in a well-studied and
accepted science.
Yet in criminal cases, particularly with the individualization spe-
cialties, courts have not required any such independent proof from
98. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 20 (Mass. 2005).
99. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
100. See, e.g., McLain v. Metabolife Int'l, 401 F.3d 1233, 1239-52 (11th Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing an expert who substituted his own opinion for scientific proof that plain-
tiffs use of defendant's supplements caused plaintiffs strokes and heart attack);
Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 886 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing
plaintiffs experts' opinions that silicone breast implants caused autoimmune dis-
eases as not reliably grounded on existing data). In both these cases (and others),
courts have determined that the data is connected to the opinion only by the "ipse
dixit" of the expert, which, as the Supreme Court said in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), may be insufficient for admissibility. "[N]othing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered." Id. at 146.
101. See, e.g., Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 61 P.3d 1068, 1081 (Utah 2002); Brad-
ley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1994); Summers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Sys.,
132 F.3d 599, 604 (10th Cir. 1997) (all holding expert testimony that defendant's
product caused multiple chemical sensitivity in plaintiffs was rightly excluded
under Daubert's reliability standard).
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prosecutors and have allowed in virtually all forms of their expert evi-
dence.10 2 Often, the sole verification for individualization is the ex-
aminer's claims that based upon their experience, they know a match
when they see one. 10 3 That is a far cry from the United States Su-
preme Court's admonition in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,'0 4 that
all expert evidence must "rest[ I on a reliable foundation,"10 5 and it is
a great deal closer to phrenology's claims of accuracy. Moreover, the
experience-based proof of reliability comes nowhere near the court's
admonition that "a trial court should consider the specific factors iden-
tified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability
of expert testimony."1o6
Despite the glaring shortcomings of forensic individualization spe-
cialties and the mandate that federal trial courts act as gatekeepers to
exclude unreliable evidence, 10 7 courts have been steadfast in continu-
ing to admit such testimony.10 8 Although a handful of courts have at
least prevented some of these experts from testifying about a conclu-
sion,109 the clear trend is in favor of admission of such evidence.
102. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 28. Defendants have had more difficulty in
attempts to have similar types of evidence admitted. See, e.g., United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of a qualified forensic expert where
it found an "absence of a sufficiently verifiable, quantitative basis" for the opin-
ion). The subject of defense attempts to introduce expert evidence is also beyond
the scope of this Article but will be addressed in the author's forthcoming book
mentioned in note 11, supra.
103. See, e.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 54, at § 24-5.5 (explaining the dangers
of forensic experts claiming that their conclusion is based on "years of experi-
ence"). See also Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World, supra note 62, at 84-86
(discussing the problems of experiential-based conclusions).
104. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 137.
105. Id. at 141 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993)). In Daubert, the Supreme Court suggested that five factors (testing, error
rate, peer review, maintenance of standards and controls, and general accept-
ance) might be helpful to determining whether scientific evidence is reliable.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The Kumho Tire decision extended the reliability
requirement to all expert evidence. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141.
106. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
107. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
108. See, for example, United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) and United
States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002), each upholding the trial court's
decision that expert testimony regarding handwriting comparisons and conclu-
sions of authorship met Daubert's reliability standard. Other examples include,
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), United States v. George,
363 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2004), United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003),
and United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), each finding that
fingerprint comparisons met Daubert's reliability requirements, and Bryan v.
State, 935 P.2d 338 (Okla. Crim. App. Ct. 1997), affirming the admission of testi-
mony that hair samples were microscopically consistent.
109. See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005) (limiting expert
testimony about tool-marks to points of comparison, but disallowing testimony
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III. PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
A. Prosecutorial Goals and Obligations
What are the proper goals and ends of prosecution? Arguably,
proper prosecutions determine truth, convict the guilty, exonerate the
innocent, reaffirm the justness of our justice system, and aid in the
preservation of the common tranquility by using civilized methods to
punish lawbreakers.110 The prosecution of citizens in this country has
been exceedingly successful, if one measures success by the number of
convicts."1 There are now more than two million people in jail, lead-
ing commentators to refer to the rise of the "prison-industrial com-
plex" and to write disturbingly about the effects of such a punitive
system.112
about conclusions); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)
(limiting handwriting comparison conclusion); United States v. Santillan, No.
CR-96-40169, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1999); Pre-Trial Transcript of
United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 1997).
110. "One hopefully rather uncontroversial goal [of the Justice Department] is that of
prosecuting only guilty people, convicting them, and doing so in accordance with
law (defined broadly)." Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents
and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 794 (2003). Professor Richman
also urges prosecutors to proceed "with a degree of moderation." Id. Professor
Zacharias also notes that in the adversarial system, "[flairness and respect for
client individuality play an equal part, even though full assertion of client rights
may interfere with truth-seeking." Fred A. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 56
(1991).
111. "Success" may be an inapt term, in light of the unequal and horrific effect such
prosecutions have had on the poor and minorities. See Abbe Smith, Can You Be a
Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 363-75
(2001) (discussing the impact of prosecutions on impoverished and African Amer-
ican citizens); DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 133-46 (The New Press 1999) (describing with detailed
statistics the unequal arrest, incarceration, and death penalty rates for African
Americans as compared with Caucasians); J. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Judges,
Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L. REV. 481 (2005) (discuss-
ing the "systemic racism" that permeates the criminal justice system).
In an opinion excoriating the Sentencing Guidelines and the abuse of
prosecutorial discretion, Chief Judge William G. Young of the District of Massa-
chusetts, writes:
"[T]he Department [of Justice] is so addicted to plea bargaining to lever-
age its law enforcement resources to an overwhelming conviction rate
that the focus of our entire criminal justice system has shifted far away
from trials and juries and adjudication to a massive system of sentence
bargaining that is heavily rigged against the accused citizen."
United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004), decision va-
cated in part on other grounds and remanded, United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded by United States v. Pacheco, 434
F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2006).
112. See Smith, supra note 111, at 363-65 (citing THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMIMISSION 93-94 (Stephen R.
Donziger ed., 1996)). For a compelling reading on the subject, in addition to Abbe
"MISCONVICTIONS"
With rising conviction numbers has come the discovery of increas-
ing numbers of persons wrongfully convicted. Indeed, as a compre-
hensive review of exonerations concludes, "[a] ny plausible guess at the
total number of [misconvictions] ... in the last fifteen years must be in
the thousands, perhaps tens of thousands."113 Despite the rise in the
number of prosecutions, the jurisprudential belief persists that to
whom much power is given in prosecution, much is expected. Prosecu-
tors, unlike other advocates, have a two-fold obligation to vigorously
prosecute and to see that justice is done. 114 These prosecutorial du-
ties, while often synchronistic and complementary, are occasionally at
cross-purposes. For example, a prosecutor must disclose evidence that
may mitigate the degree of guilt, although she honestly believes the
defendant is guilty of the more serious degree of the crime. 1
15
A potential conflict also arises when the prosecution uses expert
testimony that may be less than reliable-such as conclusions about
hair comparison-to help convict a person the prosecutor honestly be-
lieves is guilty. The conundrum is whether justice is served when a
prosecutor decides not to use the questionable expert testimony or
whether justice is served when she does.
The prosecutorial goals of "seeking justice," "doing justice," protect-
ing the innocent, and convicting the guilty, each have a long and well-
accepted basis in tradition. 11 6 The prosecutor's "duty to seek justice,"
Smith and David Coles' writing, see David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement By Ste-
reotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without Cause,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296 (2001); accord United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d
at 266 (noting that if incarceration rates remain the same, 6.6% of U.S. residents
born in 2001 will go to prison at some time in their life and that a disproportion-
ate number will be African American or Hispanic American).
113. Gross, supra note 2, at 551.
114. See generally Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting that a prose-
cutor's obligation is not "that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done").
115. As a matter of substantive criminal procedure and ethical obligation, a prosecu-
tor must disclose to the defense evidence that tends to exculpate the defendant or
mitigate the degree of guilt. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.8(d) (2007) ("[A prosecutor shall] make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose
to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known
to the prosecutor. . . ."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B)
(1983) ("A public prosecutor ... shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the
defendant, or to the defendant if he has not counsel, of the existence of evidence,
known to the prosecutor.., that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.").
116. The morality of protecting the innocent in criminal trials in this country was rec-
ognized as far back as the Salem Witchcraft Trials of 1692, by the Rev. Increase
Mather, who helped bring the trials to an end when he wrote, "It were better that
Ten suspected Witches should escape, than that one Innocent Person should be
Condemned." Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World, supra note 62, at 43 (cit-
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is a standard traceable as far back as George Sharwood's oft-cited
1854 "Essay on Professional Ethics"117 and continues to be the current
standard, suggesting a quasi-judicial aspect. 118 The Supreme Court
has embraced the standard as well, notably in Berger v. United States:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as com-
pelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.
1 9
This unique and special role of the prosecutor is an accepted norm
embedded in the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility,120
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,121 the ABA Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,122 and numerous
state ethics codes. 12 3 Moreover, case law and ethics codes support the
free exercise of prosecutorial discretion in various decisions including
ing INCREASE MATHER, CASES OF CONSCIENCE CONCERNING EVIL SPIRITS PERSON-
ATING MEN 283 (1693)). See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 358 (1769) ("It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than
that one innocent suffer."). See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895)
(quoting Blackstone).
117. See Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?", 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 612 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?"] (cit-
ing J. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (F.B. Rothman
5th ed. 1993) (1854)).
118. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Ap-
pearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REV. 699, 728-32
(1998) (discussing the quasi-judicial role of prosecutors and collecting commen-
tary on that point).
119. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
120. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1983) ("The responsibility of a
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek jus-
tice, not merely to convict.").
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8, cmt. 1 (2007) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is ac-
corded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence.").
122. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict.").
123. See, e.g., 42 Pa. C.S. R. 3.8(d); ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R 3.8(c); OHIO
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103.
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charging, plea bargaining, dismissing cases, the method of trying
cases, and whether to appeal. 124
In reality, however, protecting the innocent from conviction does
not stand on equal footing with convicting the guilty-it is doubtful
that any elected prosecutor campaigned on the notion of cases he did
not prosecute. 12 5 Similarly, those prosecutors who decline to prosecute
because of doubts about guilt are perhaps not as likely to succeed as
those who harbor few doubts. Prosecutors who obtain "the highest
conviction rates (and, thus, reputations as the best performers) stand
the greatest chance for advancement internally."126
To date, the legal system and commentators have paid little atten-
tion to prosecutorial discretion in the use of unreliable expert testi-
mony-despite mounting evidence that misconvictions have been
based upon unreliable expert testimony. While the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibit the use of evidence the lawyer knows
to be false, 127 it says nothing about the use of evidence the lawyer
knows to be unreliable-which many would argue is a different stan-
dard and a decision prosecutors can simply defer to judges. 128 This
124. For example, the ABA Standards For Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense
Function, provide various places where a prosecutor may exercise discretion in
seeking non-criminal disposition and in deciding what to charge. See ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-
3.8 to 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993). See also Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 261 (2001) (Grifin argues in favor of a "prudence"
standard, urging prosecutors to exercise good judgment in the discretionary com-
ponent of their practice and ethics. She posits that the Supreme Court's "prudent
prosecutor" standard discussed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) en-
courages prosecutors to be cautious, careful, and exercise good judgment, largely
because of the discretionary nature of their job.).
125. In his article, System Failure, Erik Luna notes that neither trial-level prosecu-
tors nor their supervisors receive any benefit from prosecutions, dismissals, and
acquittals. Rather higher salaries, promotions, and re-elections depend in part
on rates of successful prosecutions. Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1201, 1213 (2005).
126. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134-35 (2004).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007) (provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not knowingly offer evidence that lawyer knows to be false). The amend-
ment to the rule, provided as part of Ethics 2000, also adds that "[a] lawyer may
refuse to offer evidence... that the lawyer reasonably believes is false." The ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which has largely been replaced by the
variations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in various states, provides
merely that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or
fact." DR 7-102(A)(5) (1983).
128. Since the expert evidence "trilogy" of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), federal judges have been
charged formally with the obligation to act as gatekeepers, assuring that unrelia-
ble expert testimony is not admitted at trial. A majority of states have followed
the so-called Daubert reliability test, but a substantial minority still adhere to a
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argument is compelling. 12 9 Since judges have been charged with the
obligation to exclude the chaff and admit only the wheat at trial, why
would we demand that prosecutors voluntarily refrain from using po-
tentially unreliable evidence? Because prosecutors are different.
From prosecutors, we expect prudence, discretion, and justice-not
simply advocacy. We simply expect more.
The ABA Standards For Criminal Justice provide only one specific
standard relating to expert testimony and that rule is both incom-
plete13o and unenforceable. 13 1 It states, in pertinent part:
(a) A prosecutor who engages an expert for an opinion should respect the
independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the
expert's opinion on the subject. To the extent necessary, the prosecutor
should explain to the expert his or her role in the trial as an impartial expert
called to aid the fact finders and the manner in which the examination of the
witness is conducted.
1 3 2
While this aspirational language is comforting, it does not accu-
rately reflect the use of experts by prosecutors. The experts from the
F.B.I. Crime Laboratory cannot seriously be considered as either "in-
dependent" or "impartial," particularly since the laboratory has a pol-
icy to assist only law enforcement1 3 3 and efforts to implement
independent testing of the government's forensic science have met
with a great deal of resistance.13 4
"general acceptance" standard. For a state-by-state analysis, see MORIARTY, ScI-
ENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 21 at Appx. I.
129. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific
Knowledge: Is There An Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert's Testimony?, 39
IDAHO L. REV. 341, 349 (2003) ("[Tlhe new federal jurisprudence of law/science
relations places the responsibility on trial judges and evidentiary rules, not on
lawyers. Lawyers are advocates. . . ."). While I agree with Professor Caudill's
statements as they apply to civil cases, I do not think this standard is equally
applicable to criminal cases where prosecutors are seeking to introduce evidence.
130. The rule is incomplete in failing to address reliability.
131. The ABA Standards For Criminal Justice "are intended to be used as a guide to
professional conduct and performance. They are not intended to be used as crite-
ria of the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor to determine
the validity of a conviction." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECU-
TION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.1 (3d ed. 1993).
132. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Standard 3-3.3 (3d ed. 1993).
133. The FBI Laboratory provides assistance only to law enforcement. See FBI, FBI
Laboratory Services, http'/www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/org/labchart.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2007).
134. See D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan:
Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1023, 1047-48 (describing the scuttling of a large-scale research project to
examine a broad range of forensic science practices and explaining the FBI's pol-
icy of denying access to DNA researchers unless they were willing to accept co-
authorship with an FBI agent).
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The role of prosecutors in deciding to exercise their discretion
should be encouraged when it comes to the use of substandard forensic
science. "The prosecutor's obligation as a 'minister of justice' to pre-
vent the conviction and punishment of innocent people is generally
thought to imply a 'gate-keeping' function." 135 And this "gatekeeping
function" ought to include the obligation not to use unreliable expert
testimony.
Professor Bruce A. Green argues that in certain circumstances, do-
ing justice
may take a certain amount of inner strength (or strength of character) for an
individual prosecutor to decide not to bring criminal charges or to dismiss
criminal charges, to comply with procedural norms that make it more difficult
to secure convictions, to confess error, or to seek to overturn a conviction that
was unfairly procured. 1 3 6
Of course, he is correct. Yet, one wonders if this goal, both laudable
and appropriate, will ever realistically be achieved.
It may be that the system asks too much of a lawyer to both play
the game and call a foul on himself during it. The first problem, of
course, is in the need for second-guessing oneself in the heat of compe-
tition, requiring prosecutors to question continually whether the in-
vestigation has nabbed the right person. From what we know about
psychology, this is an unlikely occurrence. 137 Moreover, it is certainly
not the most effective way to prosecute a case.
Professor Andrew Taslitz is a former prosecutor and a current
member of the ABA's Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the In-
tegrity of the Criminal Process. Professor Taslitz's comment is likely
a common and widely shared belief of current and former prosecutors:
"I am a former prosecutor, and, as I am sure is true of most prosecu-
tors, not once did I help to convict someone whose guilt I doubted."138
135. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588
(2003).
136. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, supra note 117, at 643.
137. In their compelling argument about the problems regarding observer effects in
forensic science, Professor Risinger and co-authors discuss confirmation bias:
"the tendency to test a hypothesis by looking for instances that confirm it rather
than by searching for potentially falsifying instances . . . ." Risinger et al., supra
note 39, at 7. While the authors were addressing forensic science principles, the
problem of confirmation bias is one that potentially permeates all criminal inves-
tigations and trials-once the investigators and prosecutors believe they have the
guilty person, their actions will be in accordance with that belief. Accord Luna,
supra note 125, at 1211 n.33 (discussing confirmatory bias in law enforcement as
a potential cause for wrongful conviction); Findley & Scott, supra note 40, at
307-22 (discussing the various forms of bias that can infect criminal cases).
138. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongful Rights, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 4. Professor
Zacharias likewise recognizes that post-conviction review by a prosecutor may
include the disincentive of "confronting a prosecutor's own error or undermining
the reputation of a colleague who erred." Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecu-
tors in Serving Justice After Conviction, 58 VAD. L. REV. 171, 174 (2005).
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Unlike many other prosecutors, however, Taslitz has grown skepti-
cal of the accuracy of each conviction, although he believes "the vast
majority" of those convicted were guilty. He states "the accumulating
evidence examined by the media suggests that my confidence in my
near-infallibility was misplaced. There is a significant chance that at
least a few of those suspects whom I prosecuted were entirely inno-
cent."139 Professor Taslitz, however, may be the rare former prosecu-
tor. Other prosecutors are not so willing to revisit the past in an
attempt to set their lands in order.140
Florida prosecutors began a forceful campaign in 2003 to oppose
the use of DNA testing to prove the innocence of convicts, despite the
fact that more than 130 prisoners have been freed by DNA testing in
the last 15 years.141 Prosecutors in those cases claim that it is time to
"reconsider the power of DNA evidence," claiming its usefulness in
many cases is overstated. 142
A good example of the psychological resistance to reconsidering
criminal convictions is the bullet-lead controversy. The FBI recently
discontinued the use of bullet-lead following a scathing report by the
National Academy of Science (NAS). Despite admitting that the man-
ufacturing and distribution of bullets was too variable to testify about
matches, the FBI Laboratory director inexplicably stated, "We stand
by the reports of the results we have already issued."143 Unquestiona-
bly, there is real cognitive dissonance involved in believing one's work
could have led to the conviction of an innocent person. As is seen re-
peatedly, prosecutors often object to post-conviction DNA testing,
when its results could clearly prove the defendant's innocence. 144
Moreover, in cases in which misconvicted people are being exoner-
ated, prosecutors often express doubts about the accuracy of the exon-
eration (perhaps again re-proving the confirmation bias problem) 14 5
and sometimes even express a sense of persecution. In the case of
139. Taslitz, supra note 138, at 4.
140. See Medwed, supra note 126, at 138-39 (explaining prosecutors' psychological re-
sistance to believing they convicted innocent people).
141. See Adam Litpak, Prosecutors Fight Back as DNA Appeals Rise and Prisoners Go
Free, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 30, 2003, at News 3.
142. Id.
143. Piller, supra note 33. For a fuller discussion of the NAS panel report, see Mori-
arty & Saks, supra note 20, at 22.
144. See Medwed, supra note 126 (explaining the various reasons why prosecutors re-
sist post-conviction testing).
145. See Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Role: Mandatory Vide-
otaping of Interrogations is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions,
32 Loy. Cm. L. J. 337, 347-48 (2001) (describing the Illinois state prosecutors'
refusal to admit they had erroneously convicted defendants who had falsely con-
fessed, despite scientific proof of innocence, proof of physical impossibility of
guilt, or the conviction of another person).
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Josiah Sutton, for example, the prosecutor stated, "Why is this hap-
pening to me when I set out to do the right thing?"146
B. Suggested Changes
If it is too much to ask prosecutors to second-guess their scientific
and expert evidence in the heat of trial or after a conviction, perhaps
prosecutors should think about their discretionary actions in the pre-
indictment and pre-trial stages of the case, where much of the forensic
science is developed as the bedrock of the prosecution. Although indi-
vidual prosecutors may have very little ability to make laboratories
use blind procedures or become certified, the Attorney General can do
so and the elected District Attorneys are able to work with crime labo-
ratories to encourage a more science-based system, where blind test-
ing, controls, and more careful procedures are in place. 147 While there
has been movement in that direction, the problems are still
widespread.
Individual prosecutors, however, do have the choice not to intro-
duce flimsy scientific evidence, such as visual hair comparison evi-
dence or bite-mark evidence, which proficiency studies show has
perhaps a greater likelihood of being wrong than being right.148 Pros-
ecutors can likewise choose to use the evidence in a more limited man-
ner, when serious questions have been raised about the basis for
declaring a match, such as with hair, handwriting, or tool-mark
comparison. 149
However, we cannot simply expect prosecutors to back off such
compelling evidence without suggesting norms that might compel
them to reconsider, much the way Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of
146. Alan Bernstein, Crime Lab Scandal Leaves Prosecutor Feeling Betrayed, Hous.
CHRONICLE, Mar. 16, 2003, at A23 (quoting Joe Owmby, the Sutton case prosecu-
tor). Owmby also went on in that interview to compare Sutton's experience of
spending over four years as a teenager in prison to Owmby's time in the armed
forces. "If I were Sutton I would never say that [the system] has worked. Be-
cause I have been places for a long period of time that I didn't want to be." Ac-
cording to defense expert criminologist, Professor William Thompson, Owmby
should have known about the grossly inaccurate DNA analysis. Id.
147. For discussions of the way in which institutional reform of criminal laboratories
could be accomplished, see Koppl, supra note 37 and ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra
note 2.
148. Saks & Koehler, supra note 19, at 895 (discussing error rates in proficiency
testing).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005) (where
the judge reluctantly admitted expert testimony whereby the expert could discuss
the points of similarity in bullet casings found at the scene and those test fired
from defendant's weapon, but noting the "sloppy practices" of the prosecution
experts).
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Professional Conduct150 and the Supreme Court have done in the
criminal procedure area with respect to exculpatory evidence.151
Model Rule 3.8 could be amended to provide a new norm governing
prosecutorial behavior with respect to expert evidence:
The Prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
make reasonable efforts to assure that only reliable expert evidence is ad-
mitted into evidence. A prosecutor shall not use evidence that she knows
or reasonably should know is unreliable.
Additionally, the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice could also be amended to include an exhortation
against using unreliable expert testimony.
(a) A prosecutor who engages an expert for an opinion should respect the
independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation
of the expert's opinion on the subject. To the extent necessary, the prose-
cutor should explain to the expert his or her role in the trial as an impar-
tial expert called to aid the fact finders and the manner in which the
examination of the witness is conducted. A prosecutor should not seek to
rely upon unreliable expert testimony, particularly when such testimony
would be important to a determination of guilt. (suggested amendment in
italics)
These suggested changes are not panaceas, but might be one step to-
ward a new prosecutorial philosophy about expert evidence and one
that might begin to change the all-too-frequent problem of
misconvictions.
An obvious problem with these suggested rule changes, however, is
that it requires the prosecutor to determine reliability-rather than
allowing the court to do so. Thus, "reliability" would need to be a care-
fully-defined term that would only require a prosecutor to not rely on
evidence that meets a very specific, limited definition. In all other
circumstances-such as when the defense raises a challenge to relia-
bility-the prosecutor would be entitled to have the matter of reliabil-
ity decided by the court. The following is the proposed definition of
"unreliable."
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2007) provides, in pertinent part,
that:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with the sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor. ...
But see Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 720 (1987) (expressing skepticism
that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct help, noting the extremely limited
number of sanctions following established Brady violations).
151. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (all discussing the contours of
the prosecution's obligation to disclose exculpatory information).
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"Unreliable" denotes that a reasonable person has a factual basis to believe
that the proposed evidence is incorrect, inaccurate, incomplete, misleading,
substantially flawed, or without solid foundation.
Although this definition falls close to the prohibition against using
evidence the lawyer knows or reasonably believes is false, 15 2 it seeks
to fill the gap between arguable evidence and false evidence. This gap
is substantial and may well be implicated in numerous wrongful con-
victions. For example, after prosecutors learn of substantial miscon-
duct in the laboratory, they should refrain from using results
generated by that lab and seek to have such results retested by an-
other lab. When prosecutors know that visual hair comparison is ter-
ribly flawed, they should not use it in court since they know the
potential for error. They may not know that it is false, but they rea-
sonably should know that it is unreliable. We should expect this much
from prosecutors.
The second suggested change is one made by other commentators:
Begin serious enforcement of the disciplinary rules when the actions
of prosecutors contribute to misconvictions. 15 3 As scholars note, pros-
ecutors rarely receive ethical sanctions for their misconduct, even
when it leads to wrongful conviction. 154 Where a prosecutor reasona-
bly should have known 155 that evidence is unreliable and integral to a
conviction, that prosecutor should face ethical sanctions for a decision
to use it against a defendant.
These suggestions are burdensome for the prosecution. Yet, the
real purpose of suggesting these changes is not to tie a prosecutor's
hands or to ramp up the rate of disciplinary actions, but rather to en-
courage prosecutors to rethink evidence that has a long history of be-
ing implicated in wrongful convictions, such as microscopic hair
comparison.156 The purpose of these proposed changes is to encourage
prosecutors to become more actively involved in the development of
the expert evidence that is critical to their cases and to be more rigor-
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007) ("A lawyer shall not
knowingly... offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2003) ("A lawyer shall not ... falsify evidence, counsel
or assist a witness to testify falsely. .. ").
153. See Ellen Yaroshevksy, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Dis-
cipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 275 (2004).
154. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 14.12 (2005 ed.) (discuss-
ing the paucity of bar discipline imposed against prosecutors for misconduct re-
lating to trial behavior).
155. The phrase "reasonably should know" is meant to track the definition used in the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, R. 1.0 (j) (2007): "'Reasonably should
know' when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable
prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question."
156. See Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal Justice
System, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 322 (2006) (noting the role that hair compar-
ison has played in convicting those later exonerated).
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ous in requiring better quality evidence to be admitted. One reason
there are few disciplinary actions against prosecutors for failing to dis-
close exculpatory material is that most prosecutors comply with that
long-standing requirement. The culture has changed with respect to
disclosure. We need to ensure that the culture changes with respect to
unreliable evidence as well. We should expect such a change from
prosecutors in their role as ministers of justice.
The other justification for this proposed ethics rule is to protect a
prosecutor who would not use the evidence except for the concern that
a supervisor will disagree with that decision. Thus, the prosecutor
concerned about a potential wrongful conviction has a stronger argu-
ment that-as an ethical obligation-he cannot use unreliable evi-
dence. It would no longer be sufficient for the prosecutor to leave it up
to the judge when there are good grounds to believe the evidence is
unreliable. In light of the often political nature of both state and fed-
eral prosecutors' offices, this ethics rule could provide a safe harbor for
a prosecutor concerned about convicting the wrong person.
IV. JUDICIAL ETHICS
In an article entitled Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century:
Tracing the Trends, Judge Roger Miner of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit carefully examined several major judicial ethics issues,
such as: campaigning, recusal, courtroom behavior, financial disclo-
sure, competence, and off-bench activities. 15 7 Neither that article nor
any other article on judicial ethics mentions the role of judicial
gatekeeping as an ethical matter-perhaps since most think of the ob-
ligation as merely a question of evidence. I posit it is far more than an
evidentiary issue. Rather, a judge has an ethical obligation as a min-
ister of justice to be a competent and honest gatekeeper, particularly
in those criminal cases in which the liberty of potentially innocent per-
sons are at risk. A fair reading of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
coupled with language from the Federal Rules of Evidence and com-
ments from Supreme Court, compel such a conclusion. The well-devel-
oped legal and philosophical principles that guide judicial decision-
making likewise point to such a conclusion.
A. Substantive Gatekeeping as an Ethical Obligation
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Supreme Court Doctrine
Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides that the evidence rules
"shall be constructed to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and de-
157. Roger J. Minor, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2004).
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velopment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be as-
certained and proceedings justly determined."158 The Supreme Court
of the United States has repeatedly referred to the search for truth as
an elemental aspect of criminal trials.159
In his concurring opinion in General Electric v. Joiner, Justice
Breyer discusses the gatekeeping role of the trial judge, stating that
"neither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of exper-
tise can excuse the judge" from exercising this obligation. 160 Indeed,
he notes, "when law and science intersect, those duties often must be
exercised with special care."16 1 He reminds the reader that it is "es-
sential in this science-related area that the courts administer the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence . . . so that the proceedings may be 'justly
determined' . . . [and] 'that the truth may be ascertained."' 16 2
Prior to 1993, the so-called Frye16 3 test of general acceptance was a
primary standard employed to determine the admissibility of novel,
scientific evidence in federal and many state courts. The actual use of
the Frye test was infrequent, in part because it was limited to expert
evidence that was both scientific and new to the courts. In 1993, how-
ever, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence and should not govern the admission of scientific
evidence. 16 4
During the past decade, the Supreme Court of the United States
has issued a ground-breaking trilogy of decisions governing the use of
expert evidence at trial: Daubert (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner
(1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999).165
The purpose for which the Court ostensibly granted certiorari in
Daubert was to determine whether the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence overruled the prior standard governing the admission of
158. FED. R. EVID. 102 (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (noting the prosecutor's role
to search for truth in criminal trials); Kumho Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 152-53 (1999) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,
171 (1986) (noting the governance of trial conduct should be done in a way that
comports with the "search for truth" and holding that the lawyer did not render
ineffective assistance of counsel to a client when he urged the client not to commit
perjury, finding no constitutional right to commit perjury).
160. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 149 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102). In the paragraph preceding this quote,
Justice Breyer is discussing toxic torts in particular. However, a fair reading
suggests that his admonition refers not only to toxic torts but to all areas in
which science intersects with evidence.
163. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
164. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S 578 (1993).
165. Id.; Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2007]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
novel scientific evidence in federal courts. The Court held that the
Rules indeed had vitiated the prior Frye standard, which mandated
that novel scientific evidence had to be "generally accepted" within its
scientific community to be admitted at trial. 16 6 "That austere stan-
dard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, should not be applied in federal trials."16 7
The Daubert Court emphasized that rules of evidence had a "lib-
eral thrust" and were incompatible with the rigid general acceptance
test. The court envisioned a flexible standard that would govern the
admission of all scientific evidence, not just novel scientific evidence.
In order to determine whether scientific evidence was admissible, the
Court instructed, the evidence must be both "scientific"-that is,
grounded in the methods and procedures of science-and be relevant
to the inquiry at hand.168
In order to be considered scientific knowledge, the Court contin-
ued, an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method. That is, there must be appropriate validation. While "not
presum[ing] to set out a definitive checklist or test," the court made a
number of observations, which of course, immediately became a spe-
cific checklist followed by many courts. Those observations were:
(1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested;
(2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review
and publication-an aid to evaluating the quality of the testing;
(3) the potential or known rate of error of the theory or technique
when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards control-
ling the technique's operation; and (5) whether the technique or the-
ory has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.169
This flexible standard for expert testimony was premised on the
idea of "evidentiary reliability" or "trustworthiness." Rather than
wholesale exclusion, Daubert opined that "v]igorous cross-examina-
tion, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof," coupled with the court's power to direct verdicts and
grant summary judgment, were the "appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence."' 7 0 The difficulty, of course, is deter-
mining where "shaky but admissible" ends and "unreliable thus inad-
missible" begins.
166. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (holding that the proposed evidence "must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs").
167. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
168. Id. at 589-91.
169. Id. at 593-94.
170. Id. at 596.
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The subsequent cases, Joiner and Kumho Tire, answered questions
that developed in the wake of Daubert. In Joiner, the court softened
the line it had earlier drawn between methodology and conclusions,
stating that
conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in ei-
ther Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to ad-
mit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
1 7 1
Kumho Tire, decided in 1999, held that the Daubert gatekeeping
requirement applied to all expert evidence, not just scientific, and also
reaffirmed the trial judge's latitude in determining what test is appro-
priate for the type of expertise before the court and whether the pro-
posed testimony meets that test:
We ... conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more spe-
cific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that
testimony's reliability. But ... the test of reliability is "flexible," and ... the
law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to
determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability
determination. 172
Although the trilogy embraces a flexible standard, the language of
Kumho Tire provides an important recommendation: "[A] trial court
should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they
are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony."17 3
When such language is coupled with Daubert's concern for "eviden-
tiary reliability-that is, trustworthiness[ ],"174 it becomes apparent
that the Supreme Court is urging courts to admit only trustworthy
expert evidence based on sufficient facts and data, and to disallow ex-
pert evidence that rests on an inadequate foundation or the ipse dixit
of the expert. Although the standard of evidentiary reliability is flexi-
ble, the language of Daubert and Kumho Tire provide guidance. As
Justice Scalia observes in his concurrence in Kumho Tire, while "the
Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to
apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an
abuse of discretion."175
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended in 2000 to reflect the
Supreme Court's requirements for expert evidence176 and many state
courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court, incorporating a
171. Gen. Electric Co., 522 U.S. at 146.
172. Kumho Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (emphasis in original)
(citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997)).
173. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
174. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (discussing the distinction between validity and
reliability).
175. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring).
176. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides:
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reliability-based standard to govern the admission of expert evidence.
While a number of states still use a general acceptance standard to
analyze expert evidence, many of those states also focus on the trust-
worthiness of such evidence.17 7
Many judicial decisions about the admissibility of forensic science,
however, assume admissibility as a default position, particularly
when there has been a long history of judicial admission of the testi-
mony, as is true with fingerprint or handwriting comparisons. In
United States v. Prime, the court agreed that it "makes sense to de-
mand proof of statistically significant results" for a novel theory, but
"where a technique has been repeatedly applied and tested by law en-
forcement and by courts for over a century, the Court does not believe
that the absence of scientific data, without more, should be the death
knell for such testimony."178 So too in the Llera Plaza case, Judge
Pollak states that since the methodology used to compare fingerprints
is "sufficiently reliable for an English court," then it should be suffi-
ciently reliable to satisfy our Rule 702.179 Yet, as commentators note,
false fingerprint identifications have been known about for de-
cades.1So Thus, the courts' reliance on the long history and acceptance
by other courts is not an approach that gets to the heart of Daubert's
requirements or the ethical obligation of what judges do as gatekeep-
ers: help assure that justice is done by admitting only reliable
evidence.
While both Prime and Llera Plaza addressed numerous other fac-
tors that were relevant to their decision and to Daubert's reliability
requirements, neither court seemed willing to acknowledge the possi-
bility that admitting evidence without sufficient scientific foundation
increases the chance of convicting an innocent person.
2. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides a great deal of
generalized language about the proper actions of judges on and off the
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
177. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 24.
178. Unites States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
179. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
180. See Simon A. Cole, "Implicit Testing". Can Casework Validate Forensic Tech-
niques?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 126-28 (2006) (discussing misattributed finger-
prints between 1920 and 2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The
Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002).
[Vol. 86:1
"MISCONVICTIONS"
bench but pays little attention to the details of the actual work ofjudg-
ing.i8 1 The Preamble provides,
[T]he judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and
the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the
precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the
judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence
in the legal system.
This hortatory language provides little in terms of specificity, yet the
point it makes is clear: the judiciary has an obligation to honestly and
meaningfully apply the rule of law.
The concept that judicial office is a "public trust" dovetails with the
Federal Rules of Evidence admonition that the Rules must be con-
strued to secure fairness, truth, and just determinations. As trustees
of justice, it is the courts' obligation to strive continually to see that
justice is served. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct has recently
been revised. The new Rule 2.2 provides normative guidance about
the judge's role in interpreting and applying the law, as the selected
rule and comments note:
RULE 2.2: ImiPAnTILI'Y AND FAntNESS
A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.
COMMENT
[1] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be ob-
jective and open-minded.
[2] Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and
personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without
regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in
question.
Thus, as a matter of judicial ethics, courts must interpret and apply
the law honestly, without regard to personal approval or disapproval
of the law. While one might argue that this new rule imports long-
established understanding into text, it is not always apparent by
judges who rule on questionable forensic evidence.
The Daubert trilogy intended to sharpen the role of the trial judge,
to give judges a far more active, determinative role in deciding
whether juries would even receive proposed expert testimony.18 2 This
181. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007), available at http://www.abanet.
org/judicialethics/.
182. See, e.g., Joelle Anne Moreno, Einstein on the Bench?: Exposing What Judges Do
Not Know About Science and Using Child Abuse Cases to Improve How Courts
Evaluate Scientific Evidence, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 531, 532 (2003) (noting the
Daubert Court's intent to "radically transform the functional, rather than theo-
retical, relationship between science and law by forcing judges to play a new,
more active role in enhancing the quality of scientific evidence used to decide
legal cases"). The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 provides a slightly different view: "Daubert did not work a
'seachange over federal evidence law,' and 'the trial court's role as gatekeeper is
not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system,'" (quoting
2007]
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role includes an ethical duty to impartially uphold and apply the law
as it applies to reliability determination.
Many scientists and legal scholars exhibit a great deal of frustra-
tion about how the appellate courts often ignore the mandate of the
U.S. Supreme Court to require the proponent of expert evidence to
prove both its reliability and its relevance. In an article written for
the ABA Judges, Professor Saks and I decry the unwillingness of
judges to exclude poor quality forensic evidence, noting "[t]here is al-
most no [prosecution] expert testimony so threadbare that it will not
be admitted if it comes to a criminal proceeding under the banner of
forensic science."1 8 3
Much forensic science-hair, fingerprint, and handwriting compar-
isons-simply has not been proven reliable, and courts' refusal to so
find has led the authors of Modern Scientific Evidence to describe the
devices employed by courts as a "catalog of evasions."18 4 At the same
time, courts have breezily disallowed defense efforts to introduce well-
grounded expert testimony about eyewitness identification problems
in all but the most extreme cases.' 8 5 This unwillingness persists in
the face of ample evidence that "the most common cause of wrongful
convictions is eyewitness identification."186
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme
Court held unequivocally that the job of the trial judge is to "ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable."18 7 In Kumho Tire, this judicial obligation to
ensure reliability was enlarged to include all types of expert testi-
mony.1 88 Nonetheless, courts continue to find ways to avoid con-
ducting meaningful reliability analyses of prosecutorial forensic
evidence. The subtext to these decisions is that courts believe that
these forensic sciences are both accurate and trustworthy and the
challenges are specious and formalistic. Yet, the accumulating data
suggest there is a great deal more error in forensic sciences than the
government acknowledges.
United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore County, Miss., 80 F.3d
1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)).
183. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 29.
184. 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAw AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 34-3 (2006-2007).
185. See cases collected in MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 21, at § 13:55.
See also United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d. 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1997) (dis-
missing concerns about eyewitness misidentification and the need for expert tes-
timony by stating that "expert testimony .. . [is] not needed, because the jury
[can] determine the reliability of eyewitness identification with the tools of cross-
examination.")
186. Gross et al., supra note 2, at 542.
187. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
188. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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Although courts are granted a great deal of discretion in how to
determine reliability, when they are presented with the type of evi-
dence where the Daubert factors are a good gauge of reliability, courts
should be using those factors, as the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire
states. And forensic individualization specialties are well-suited to be
judged by traditional scientific method factors, as used by the court in
Daubert.
As trial courts have steadfastly refused to take the Daubert trilogy
language seriously as applied to individualization evidence, courts of
appeals have steadfastly upheld such decisions under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard, with very little objection being voiced.18 9 One such
objection occurred in Judge Michael's dissenting opinion of United
States v. Crisp.190 In Crisp, the majority found that both handwriting
and fingerprint comparison was sufficiently reliable to be admitted,
primarily on the grounds that such evidence had been admitted into
evidence for decades. Judge Michael disagreed, stating, "I am not sug-
gesting that fingerprint and handwriting evidence cannot be shown to
satisfy Daubert. I am only making the point that the government did
not establish in Crisp's case that this evidence is reliable. The govern-
ment has had ten years to comply with Daubert. It should not be
given a pass in this case."1l
In a December 2005 decision, the Honorable Nancy Gertner,
United States District Court Judge for the District of Massachusetts,
allowed a tool-mark expert to testify about points of comparison be-
tween shell casings, but held he could not render an opinion about
whether the same weapon had fired the casings in questions.19 2 She
noted that although she had serious reservations about his testimony,
she felt compelled to let him testify about his observations "because of
my confidence that any other decision will be rejected by appellate
courts, in light of precedents across the country, regardless of the find-
ings I have made." 193 Although Judge Gertner is not a lone voice in
the wilderness, she is the rare judge who seems willing to admit that
the forensic emperor is wearing very tatty robes. 19 4 Most troubling
189. Curiously, however, the Florida District Court of Appeal did reverse the trial
court's decision to let Professor Simon Cole testify. Professor Cole is a leading
critic of fingerprint comparison. See Armstrong v. State, 920 So. 2d. 769 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
190. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 888
(2003).
191. Id. at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting).
192. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-09 (D. Mass. 2005).
193. Id. at 109.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. den., 540
U.S. 888 (2003) (Michael, J., dissenting); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880
F.Supp. 1027, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (a pre-Kumho Tire case holding that the
Daubert standard did not apply to forensic document examiners testifying about
handwriting comparison but that if it did apply, "[t]he Court might well have
20071
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about the opinion, however, is her obvious distress that the appellate
courts will do anything to reverse a decision that excludes the prosecu-
tion's forensic evidence. She comments compellingly that
when liberty hangs in the balance-and, in the case of the defendants facing
the death penalty, life itself-the standards should be higher than were met
in this case, and than have been imposed across the country. The more courts
admit this type of [expert] evidence without requiring documentation, profi-
ciency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure;
we should require more.195
It is not only judges who have expressed concern about courts' dis-
regard of Daubert in criminal cases. Commentators have explained
how forensic science errors contribute to misconvictions and discuss
how judges often are not applying Daubert in any meaningful fashion
to exclude expert evidence that lacks an adequate foundation.19 6
3. The Theoretical Basis for the Ethical Gatekeeping Obligation
While the Supreme Court has charged the trial court with being a
gatekeeper to make a preliminary analysis of whether the scientific
evidence is sufficiently reliable to come before the jury, that entrust-
ment alone does not make the issue one of ethics. Rather, it is the
relationship between reliability and actual guilt that makes this an
ethical matter. Gatekeeping in criminal cases requires a real determi-
nation of reliability because reliability may be meaningfully related to
actual guilt. The decision to admit unreliable expert testimony may
well increase the likelihood of convicting an innocent person. Thus, it
is an ethical and moral duty for the judge to be honest in making deci-
sions about reliability in criminal cases.
It is not enough for courts to pay lip service to this job-this job
requires a rigorous approach, where the court, working under the still
extant presumption of innocence, puts the evidence through its paces,
asking the relevant questions. To use concepts expounded on by Pro-
fessor Dworkin, we must recognize that legality is important to ensur-
ing integrity.197  Legality requires both the procedural aspect of
concluded that forensic document examination constitutes precisely the sort of
junk science that Daubert addressed.").
195. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (permitting a witness to give expert testimony
about similarity of marks between shell casings at the scene and from the defen-
dant's weapon, but forbidding the witness from testifying that it was a match "to
the exclusion of every other firearm in the world").
196. For a small sample of such articles, see Saks & Koehler, supra note 19; Craig M.
Cooley, Forensic Science or Forgettable Science?, 80 IND. L.J. 80 (2005) (discuss-
ing the "broken" forensic science system and the extensive problems that plague
forensic science); and D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are
Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99
(2000) ("Criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges to
government proffers.").
197. RONALD DwORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 176 (2006).
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applying the law and the substantive aspect that makes such law just.
"As trustees of the law, judges have an obligation to uphold and main-
tain the corpus in individual cases in accordance with the underlying
aims of the corpus. This also incorporates an obligation to maintain
its integrity." 9 8
In applying these concepts to our requirement of judicial applica-
tion of the Daubert canon, we ask the following questions: Can the test
in question be repeated and produce identical results? If not, what is
the error rate? Is the error rate sufficient to raise serious concerns
about reliability? If the test is subjective, how is it reviewed? Is the
"trust me, I'm an expert approach" sufficient? The answers to these
questions when applied to forensic individualization specialties do not
yield encouraging results. Yet, many judges ignore these questions
and answers and simply allow the testimony to be admitted.
This judicial response does not fit with our understanding of what
judges are ethically obligated to do. There is an "underlying aim" of
these reliability factors-the ascertainment of truth, as mandated by
Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Courts have discretion in
the method of application of the factors but "not discretion to abandon
the gatekeeping function .... [I]t is not discretion to perform the func-
tion inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable
means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is
junky."199 Thus, "the judge's reasoning must continually be tied back
to the corpus-with integrity and fit."200 The reason is clear: mean-
ingful application of the reliability requirements is an essential aspect
of convicting the guilty and exonerating the innocent-which again,
dovetails specifically with the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and the purpose-in criminal cases-of Daubert's reliability re-
quirement. For this area of law to maintain its integrity, indeed, its
legitimacy and rationality, it must conform with the underlying aim of
the reliability requirement.
4. Proposed Solutions
In Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial
Gatekeeping, Professor Saks and I conclude that judges are not likely
to exclude poor quality prosecution forensic evidence. 2 0 Despite the
argument here that judges should improve their gatekeeping as a
question of ethics, it is unlikely that there will be a sudden change in
the courts' willingness to exclude forensic evidence from trial. We sug-
198. Sarah MR. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity
for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1639-40 (2005).
199. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158-59 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
200. Cravens, supra note 198, at 1641.
201. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 29.
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gest, however, that certain judicial actions short of exclusion might be
helpful to safeguarding justice and preventing misconvictions. These
"middle way" suggestions may be helpful in separating the guilty from
the innocent and may address a judge's concern that excluding all fo-
rensic individualization testimony will result in the guilty going free.
First, as has occurred in some U.S. District Courts, a judge may
limit the admissibility of the evidence, even when not excluding it.202
Thus, an examiner may discuss the points of comparison and may ex-
plain how the comparison is done, but may not declare a match or
assert conclusions about identity. This approach recognizes that
based upon their experiential knowledge developed from working with
prints or handwriting, experts are likely to have knowledge helpful to
the jury. At the same time, it avoids some of the serious and troubling
foundational problems represented when the expert provides his con-
clusion about a match.
There are admitted stortcomings to disallowing evidence about a
match. If no evidence of a match is admitted, the testimony has far
less probative value for the jury. More importantly, if there is no way
to determine whether a match actually exists, as critics compellingly
argue, why should the jury be permitted to speculate about such a
match? Finally, the jury is being asked to decide whether it is a match
without any expert guidance on the subject. Nonetheless, on balance,
it seems preferable to allow the expert to testify about points of com-
parison than to allow unbridled testimony about a match. This com-
promise parallels the rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b),
which allows testimony from an expert about a defendant's mental ill-
ness but prohibits an expert from testifying whether the defendant
possessed "the mental state or condition constituting an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto."
Second, courts can limit testimony and phrasing that is either
overpowering to a jury or misleading. Many of the forensic individual-
ization specialties claim to reach conclusions to degrees of certainty
that are not scientifically grounded, such as fingerprint and handwrit-
ing comparison. 20 3 Moreover, witnesses also talk about a match-
such as with bite-marks-when all they can legitimately state is that
there is some degree of concordance and some similarity, but that such
similarity may be true for a large percentage of the population.20 4
202. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005) (limiting
expert testimony about tool-marks to points of comparison, but disallowing testi-
mony about conclusions); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass.
1999) (limiting handwriting comparison conclusion); United States v. Santillan,
No. CR-96-40169 DLJ, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1999); Pre-Trial
Transcript, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo.
Feb. 5, 1997).
203. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 20, at 29.
204. Id. at 29-30.
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Even the statement "consistent with" suggests a match, but may
mean far less than that. It may actually mean "consistent with a
large percentage of the population," as would be true in microscopic
comparison of hair. Although many experts have been allowed to
make such statements, the danger is that juries overvalue such testi-
mony, believing that "consistent with" is akin to certainty. 20 5 Exclud-
ing phrases such as "identification," "match," "unique," "no other in
the world," "indeed and without doubt," and "zero error rate," would go
a long way to rendering this testimony less harmful and more accu-
rate than it currently is. Also, requiring experts to testify about error
rates would temper the jury's unreal expectations of such evidence.
Third, courts need to allow defendants to hire experts and allow
those defense experts to testify and present contrary evidence. Some
courts evaluate defense experts more rigorously than prosecution ex-
perts,20 6 while others are reluctant to permit experts for the defense
to testify and challenge the methods and conclusions of the prosecu-
tion's experts.20 7 This step, however, is important. If courts are not
going to require more of prosecution experts, then they need to permit
jurors to learn about the shortcomings of the expert evidence
presented as infallible. As the Supreme Court noted in Daubert,
"presentation of contrary evidence" is one appropriate method of at-
tacking "shaky but admissible evidence."2o8
Finally, courts should be willing to take up the suggestion posed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the Supreme Court to "procure the
assistance of an expert of its own choosing."20 9 While expert panels
have been used in civil cases (notably the silicone breast implant
cases), courts have been reluctant to use them in criminal cases. Ap-
pointing an expert or an expert panel in a high-profile case might be
particularly useful for other cases as well.
205. Id. at 30 (citing Professor Sak's preliminary study of how juries misinterpret
much of this phrasing).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (Uphold-
ing decision disallowing qualified defense expert on forensic science to testify that
in a violent rape case, a transfer of hair or fluids between victim and perpetrator
"would be expected," the appellate court held that the phrase "'would be expected'
expresses an intrinsically probabilistic or quantitative idea, [yet] the probability
it expresses is unclear, imprecise and ill-defined.").
207. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 920 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding
trial court's decision to disallow defense expert's testimony about the unreliabil-
ity of fingerprint comparison); United States v. Paul, 175 F. 3d 906, 912 (11th Cir.
1999) (affirming district court's decision to exclude defense witness from testify-
ing about shortcomings of forensic document examiner's methodology and
conclusions).
208. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
209. Id. at 595.
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Judges are trustees of the law. They must begin to live up to this
fiduciary responsibility by ensuring that trials which use forensic sci-
ence are safe for the innocent.
V. CONCLUSION
The number of exonerations continues to grow along with our
awareness that all is not well with forensic science. This Article en-
courages the Ministers of Justice to exercise their discretion in ways
that will help reduce the number of innocent people who are wrong-
fully convicted on the basis of poor-quality forensic science. It is not
just a question of evidence. It is a matter of ethics.
